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In the market for wireless telecommunications, radio spectrum is an essential input. We study
downstream entry and capacity choice in this market, where licenses to use radio spectrum are
owned by vertically integrated duopolists. Prior to network construction, these incumbents may
offer contracts for capacity to an entrant, granting service-based access on the network they will
construct. Alternatively, when spectrum trading is allowed, they may sell part of their license,
allowing the entrant to build its own network and enter as an infrastructure player. We ﬁnd that
in this Cournot setting, access is generally provided, as incumbents compete to appropriate the
proﬁts of serving a differentiated market through the entrant. Although selling spectrum rights
instead of network capacity leads to a loss of economies of scale in infrastructure construction,
infrastructure-based entry may dominate as a result of a strategic effect. By delegating capacity
choice to the entrant, the access providing incumbent can commit to compete more aggressively,
causing its rival incumbent to reduce capacity. A lower aggregate capacity will increase prices
and thereby proﬁts.
Keywords: Telecommunications, Vertical Integration, Vertical Foreclosure, Strategic Delegation.
JEL classiﬁcation: L13, L42, L96.
Abstract in Dutch
Radiospectrum is een essentiële input voor draadloze telecommunicatie. We analyseren
benedenstroomse toetreding en capaciteitsbeslissingen in een markt waar de licenties om
radiospectrum te gebruiken in handen zijn van verticaal geïntegreerde duopolisten. Voorafgaand
aan de bouw van hun netwerken kunnen deze gevestigde spelers contracten aanbieden aan een
toetreder. Aan de ene kant kunnen ze toegang geven tot hun eigen netwerk. Aan de andere kant
kunnen ze een deel van hun spectrumlicentie verkopen aan de toetreder. De toetreder kan dan
zijn eigen netwerk bouwen en zo actief worden op de markt. De handel in spectrumlicenties
moet dan wel zijn toegestaan. We vinden dat de gevestigde spelers in een Cournotspel altijd
toegang verlenen aan de toetreder. Dit komt doordat ze in een gedifferentieerde markt
concurreren om de winst van de toetreder. Wanneer een toetreder een eigen netwerk bouwt,
worden schaaleffecten niet optimaal benut. Toch kan het voor gevestigde spelers aantrekkelijk
zijn om toegang te verlenen tot de eigen infrastructuur vanwege een strategisch effect. Door de
capaciteitskeuze aan de toetreder te delegeren, kan de gevestigde speler zich namelijk
committeren om minder agressief te concurreren. Hierdoor vermindert diens concurrent ook zijn
capaciteit. De lagere totale capaciteit verhoogt de prijzen en daardoor de winst.
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56Summary
Radio spectrum is an essential input for wireless telecommunications such as mobile telephony,
wireless internet access or radio broadcasting. Access to this essential resource is restricted to
those owning a license. Licenses for using radio spectrum have been introduced in response to a
negative externality: too many market participants broadcasting on the same frequency range
may cause mutual interference, degrading signal quality. The restriction of access to a limited
number of license holders allows these to internalise the externality.
A reduction in the number of players who have access to radio spectrum may also introduce
market power in the markets for wireless telecommunications services. Typically relatively few
licenses in frequency domains suitable for a particular type of wireless telecommunications are
available. License holders will make choices on technology and infrastructure investments,
determining the capacity of services they will be able to provide using the patch of radio
spectrum allocated to them. Competition in capacity investments between this limited number of
license owners may then lead to a suboptimal ﬁnal capacity level, which allows ﬁrms to reap
downstream oligopoly rents.
However, oligopoly ownership of upstream spectrum rights does not necessarily imply an
oligopoly downstream market. New entrants who do not own a license may contract with the
original license holders to use their upstream spectrum rights and provide differentiated services
to their customers. We ask whether incumbent license holders will be able to extend their
oligopoly ownership of the upstream good – licenses for use of radio spectrum – into a
downstream oligopoly of provision of wireless capacity. Will entrants obtain access, and will
this entry harm the upstream oligopolists’ proﬁts?
In analysing an entrant’s opportunities for access, we distinguish between two modes of
access: service-based access and infrastructure-based access. First, incumbent spectrum owners
may ﬁnd it worthwhile to offer some capacity on their network to downstream competitors in the
wireless telecommunications market, providing service-based access. Secondly, an entrant may
buy (or lease) part of the incumbent’s spectrum license, and construct its own infrastructure. In
this case, the entrant will be able to make independent choices on technology and infrastructure,
and on the resulting ﬁnal capacity it will offer in the downstream market. There is a cost for the
incumbent, as it will retain a lower amount of spectrum for its own use, forcing it to invest in
more spectrum efﬁcient equipment if it wants to produce similar end-use capacity.
Infrastructure-based access relies on the possibility of spectrum trade, where licenses may be
sold in whole or in part. Introduction of such spectrum trade is currently a topic of policy
discussions.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we aim to analyse whether in equilibrium the
incumbents who own spectrum licenses will allow entry into the market. Second, we study
which type of access occurs in equilibrium. Will an incumbent prefer to offer a contract for
7service-based access, reserving capacity on his own network for the entrant, or will he grant
access to part of his licensed spectrum, enabling the entrant to build his own infrastructure and
make an independent choice of ﬁnal capacity to offer? Whereas currently service-based access is
quite common, facilitating full infrastructure-based access requires further regulatory steps to
enable market participants to redeﬁne spectrum rights themselves. From a policy point of view,
we ask whether such further regulatory steps could bring additional beneﬁts in spectrum use.
At ﬁrst sight, the loss of economies of scale in infrastructure-based entry implies that i)
aggregate capacity investment under infrastructure based access will be lower than for
service-based access, and ii) both entrant and joint proﬁts will be reduced. This would suggest
that for incumbents offering service-based access would be a dominant strategy, and that the
implementation of spectrum trade would not lead to an increasing number of networks. We
argue, however, that commitment properties of both types of access are different. As a result,
selling spectrum, rather than access to a network, gives spectrum owners a strategic advantage
over rivals, which may offset the loss of economies of scale.
We assume that the spectrum owning incumbents can either offer an entrant capacity on their
own networks, or sell part of their spectrum to the entrant. Then, spectrum license holders make
capacity choices and compete for end-users. Although we assume there are economies of scale
in infrastructure construction which tend to favour service-based access, we ﬁnd that spectrum
sale (and subsequent infrastructure-based entry) may dominate as a result of a strategic effect.
Selling spectrum and having the entrant construct its own network allows the incumbent to
delegate the capacity choice to the entrant. This acts as a commitment to increase joint
incumbent-entrant capacity. Since capacities are strategic substitutes, the rival incumbent is led
to decrease output, leaving the access provider and the entrant with higher bilateral proﬁts.
In preparing this paper we received useful comments from many people. We thank in
particular Cédric Argenton, Jan Boone, seminar participants at the 2008 EARIE conference in
Toulouse, the 17th ITS conference in Montreal, at CPB and TILEC. All remaining errors are our
own.
81 Introduction
Radio spectrum is an essential input for wireless telecommunications such as mobile telephony,
wireless internet access or radio broadcasting. Access to this essential resource is restricted to
those owning a license. Licenses for using radio spectrum have been introduced in response to a
negative externality: too many market participants broadcasting on the same frequency range
may cause mutual interference, degrading signal quality. The restriction of access to a limited
number of license holders allows these to internalise the externality (see e.g. Faulhaber and
Farber, 2002; Cave, 2006b).
A reduction in the number of players who have access to radio spectrum may also introduce
market power in the markets for wireless telecommunications services. Typically relatively few
licenses in frequency domains suitable for a particular type of wireless telecommunications are
available. License holders will make choices on technology and infrastructure investments,
determining the capacity of services they will be able to provide using the patch of radio
spectrum allocated to them. Competition in capacity investments between this limited number of
license owners may then lead to a suboptimal ﬁnal capacity level, which allows ﬁrms to reap
downstream oligopoly rents.
However, oligopoly ownership of upstream spectrum rights does not necessarily imply an
oligopoly downstream market. New entrants who do not own a license may contract with the
original license holders to use their upstream spectrum rights and provide differentiated services
to their customers. We ask whether incumbent license holders will be able to extend their
oligopoly ownership of the upstream good – licenses for use of radio spectrum – into a
downstream oligopoly of provision of wireless capacity. Will entrants obtain access, and will
this entry harm the upstream oligopolists’ proﬁts?
In analysing an entrant’s opportunities for access, we distinguish between two modes of
access: service-based access and infrastructure-based access. First, incumbent spectrum owners
may ﬁnd it worthwhile to offer some capacity on their network to downstream competitors in the
wireless telecommunications market. An important mode of downstream access in mobile
telephony, for instance, is that of Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs). MVNOs lease
wholesale capacity on an incumbent’s mobile network and sell services that use this capacity to
their retail customers. This form of wholesale access is referred to as service-based access. It has
proved popular in the European mobile market: around four mobile telephony network operators
are active in each country, but the total number of downstream service providers is substantially
higher, up to 60 in the Netherlands and 70 in the UK (European Commission, 2006).
A second mode of access is infrastructure-based access. An entrant may buy (or lease) part
of the incumbent’s spectrum license, and construct its own infrastructure. In this case, the
entrant will be able to make independent choices on technology and infrastructure, and on the
resulting ﬁnal capacity it will offer in the downstream market. There is a cost for the incumbent,
9as it will retain a lower amount of spectrum for its own use, forcing it to invest in more spectrum
efﬁcient equipment if it wants to produce similar end-use capacity.
Infrastructure-based access relies on the possibility of spectrum trade, where licenses may be
sold in whole or in part. Historically governments severely restricted the use of licensed
spectrum (both regarding type of use and regarding the identity of the user), but current policy
aims in many countries include making spectrum licenses more ﬂexible and transferable (see, for
the EU, European Commission, 2006; Faulhaber and Farber, 2002, and Cave, 2006b provide an
overview of such policy discussions in Europe and the United States). Note that spectrum access
is an essential input. An entrant has to enter into a transaction with an incumbent owning
spectrum for either network capacity or for spectrum access. This situation differs from entry
into ﬁxed-line telecommunications, where infrastructure-based access (constructing one’s own
network) can typically be achieved independently of the incumbents.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we aim to analyse whether in equilibrium the
incumbents who own spectrum licenses will allow entry into the market. Second, we study
which type of access occurs in equilibrium. Will an incumbent prefer to offer a contract for
service-based access, reserving capacity on his own network for the entrant, or will he grant
access to part of his licensed spectrum, enabling the entrant to build his own infrastructure and
make an independent choice of ﬁnal capacity to offer? Whereas currently service-based access is
quite common, facilitating full infrastructure-based access requires further regulatory steps to
enable market participants to redeﬁne spectrum rights themselves. From a policy point of view,
we ask whether such further regulatory steps could bring additional beneﬁts in spectrum use.
At ﬁrst sight, the loss of economies of scale in infrastructure-based entry implies that i)
aggregate capacity investment under infrastructure based access will be lower than for
service-based access, and ii) both entrant and joint proﬁts will be reduced. This would suggest
that for incumbents offering service-based access would be a dominant strategy, and that the
implementation of spectrum trade would not lead to an increasing number of networks. We
argue, however, that commitment properties of both types of access are different. As a result,
selling spectrum, rather than access to a network, gives spectrum owners a strategic advantage
over rivals, which may offset the loss of economies of scale.
We focus on a situation where licenses have been allocated, but ﬁrms’ capacity choices have
not been made. We do not study how spectrum rights are initially allocated to the incumbents. In
practice spectrum rights are often allocated through beauty contests, or grandfathered to existing
incumbents. Increasingly governments also use auctions, but even in that case the number of
licenses is usually ﬁxed. Our model may be viewed as analysing the implications of this ﬁxed
number of players in the post-allocation market.
The spectrum owning incumbents can either offer an entrant capacity on their own networks,
or sell part of their spectrum to the entrant. In the former situation, the incumbent has to
construct a network of sufﬁcient capacity to also meet the entrant’s contractual requirements for
10services. In the latter situation, the incumbent will raise his own costs of constructing a network
of similar capacity, as it will require more spectrum efﬁcient technology to produce such
capacity with a smaller amount of spectrum. After the contracting stage, we assume that the
ﬁrms engage in differentiated goods Cournot competition. The spectrum scarcity relevant for
wireless telecommunications justiﬁes our assumption of competition in quantities, where
capacity investment precedes competition in the end user market.
We analyse the access game for the case of an upstream duopoly of spectrum license owners.
We allow the two incumbents to propose general non-linear tariffs to the entrant for either
capacity on their networks (service-based access) or for access to their spectrum (after which the
entrant can construct its own infrastructure).
We ﬁnd that incumbents will provide entry if the joint proﬁts of the incumbent and the
entrant exceed the no-entry duopoly proﬁts. Moreover, since both incumbents compete to
provide access in this case, part of the rents of access may be left with the entrant. If incumbents
are sufﬁciently symmetric they face a prisoner’s dilemma: both prefer a situation where the
entrant stays out of the market, but given that their rival does not provide access, providing
access is a best response. In equilibrium, the rents of providing access accrue to the entrant.
Although we assume there are economies of scale in infrastructure construction which tend
to favour service-based access, we ﬁnd that spectrum sale (and subsequent infrastructure based
entry) may dominate as a result of a strategic effect. Selling spectrum and having the entrant
construct its own network allows the incumbent to delegate the capacity choice to the entrant.
This acts as a commitment to increase joint incumbent-entrant capacity. Since capacities are
strategic substitutes, the rival incumbent is led to decrease output, leaving the access provider
and the entrant with higher bilateral proﬁts.
We study an explicit example with linear demand. There, service-based access occurs when
downstream products are strongly differentiated, or economies of scale in infrastructure
construction are large. In that case the main contribution to the entrant and incumbent’s joint
proﬁts is the access to the entrant’s differentiated downstream market. Conversely we ﬁnd that
the strategic effect of infrastructure-based access dominates when downstream products are
hardly differentiated and economies of scale are not too large. In that case the delegation of the
capacity decision to the entrant allows them, jointly, to commit to a larger capacity, leading the
rival incumbent to reduce its capacity choice. Incumbent and entrant increase joint proﬁts at the
expense of the rival.
This mechanism of increasing joint proﬁts by delegating decision power to the entrant is the
reverse of the observation in Salant et al. (1983) that in a homogeneous Cournot market a merger
from three to two decreases joint proﬁts of the merging parties: two triopoly proﬁts exceed one
duopoly proﬁt. The observation that delegation of decisions to an agent may increase proﬁts has
already been observed by Schelling (1960). Caillaud and Rey (1995) provide an overview of
some of the subsequent analyses of these ideas. More speciﬁcally, the strategic effects of
11divisionalisation under Cournot competition were analysed in Corchón (1991); Polaski (1992);
Baye et al. (1996) and González-Maestre (2000).
The literature on access to upstream bottlenecks for a large part deals with access regulation
of vertically integrated monopolists, as reviewed e.g. in Armstrong (2002) and Laffont and
Tirole (2000). In this literature, usually capacity constraints are assumed to play no role, the
monopolist is required to provide access to its bottleneck against linear tariffs, and monopolist
and entrant compete in prices in a horizontally differentiated end user market. This analysis has
been particularly relevant to the case of ﬁxed line telephony, where networks were often
regarded as natural monopolies. A strand of literature has looked at the beneﬁts of entrants
building their own networks, enabling infrastructure competition, and at the demands this places
on the system of access regulation (see e.g. Cave, 2006a).
The analysis of competition among upstream oligopolists is still emerging. We are aware of
ﬁve studies on downstream access in oligopolistic upstream markets in the telecom sector,
Ordover and Shaffer (2007), Brito and Pereira (2006), Bourreau et al. (2007), Höfﬂer and
Schmidt (2008) and Dewenter and Haucap (2006). These studies ask the question – as we do –
on what terms an entrant will be offered access if multiple integrated players compete in the
bottleneck sector. The ﬁrst four papers studies situations where incumbents offer linear tariffs to
the entrant, and capacity constraints play no role. They each identify mechanisms that might
lead to foreclosure of the entrant. Ordover and Shaffer (2007) and Brito and Pereira (2006) both
focus on endogenous product differentiation by the entrant, and the possibility that the entrant
cannibalises on the market of its supplier. Bourreau et al. (2007) demonstrate that in equilibrium
the access provider’s upstream income from access softens its price competition in the
downstream market, which is beneﬁcial for its rival incumbent. This may result in a situation
where both incumbents prefer their rival to provide entry, and coordination failure may result.
Höfﬂer and Schmidt (2008) is related to this analysis, but these authors study a situation where
incumbents do not compete to attract entrants. Dewenter and Haucap (2006) consider different
types of competition and also note the strategic delegation effect we identify.
Our analysis is related to this strand of literature. In contrast to the existing work, we allow
for two different access modes: service-based and infrastructure-based access, to study what
type of access incumbents will prefer. Furthermore, we focus on Cournot competition instead of
competition in prices as in most papers. Finally, we analyse nonlinear contracts and the impact
of contracting externalities, instead of linear price contracts with the entrant. In vertically related
markets with both upstream and downstream market power, linear prices give rise to double
marginalisation, introducing an inefﬁciency in addition to the contracting externality that we
want to study. Nonlinear contracts eliminate double marginalisation. Our paper is closest to the
Cournot analysis by Dewenter and Haucap (2006). Unlike that paper, we focus on the
differences in commitment power between the various access modes. Moreover, we model
explicitly the contracting game that precedes the competition stage.
12Indeed, our paper is related to the literature on vertical contracting, and on vertical foreclosure
and exclusive dealing in particular (see e.g. Rey and Tirole, 2007 and Whinston, 2006, chapter 4
for recent overviews). Salinger (1988) considers vertical foreclosure as a result of vertical
mergers in bilaterally oligopolistic Cournot markets, under the assumption of linear pricing. Our
analysis is more closely related to Hart and Tirole (1990), who demonstrate that even without the
inefﬁciency of linear pricing, vertical mergers may be proﬁtable. The reason may be tracked
down to a failure to contract efﬁciently due to contracting externalities, as also pointed out in
Bernheim and Whinston (1998). These authors focus on non-linear contracts for quantities in
markets where either the upstream or downstream sector is a monopoly. They analyse
equilibrium contracts which may involve exclusivity clauses. We observe that we can adapt their
analysis for duopoly upstream providers and a single downstream player, to accommodate the
situation where these upstream players are active on the downstream market themselves as well.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. First we discuss the model and apply it
to the simpler situation of a monopoly incumbent to illustrate terminology and mechanisms in a
simple setting. Then we turn to the upstream duopoly contracting game and describe the
contracting equilibrium in general. Next, we characterise ﬁrm proﬁts under service-based access
and infrastructure-based access, and analyse the equilibria and the distribution of rents for a
particular example. We summarise and conclude in section 5.
13142 A benchmark: monopoly incumbent
We start our discussion by introducing the model in a monopoly context. This will serve as a
benchmark situation, and allow us to introduce terminology and notation in a simpler framework.
The incumbent
A monopoly mobile operator owns (a license to use) one unit of mobile spectrum, and will use it
to offer wireless telecommunications services (say, mobile telephony) to end users. We will refer
to the ﬁrm as the vertically integrated incumbent, denoted byV. We assume that the unit of radio
spectrum (a ﬁnite frequency range) controlled by V represents all radio spectrum suitable for
mobile telephony. The incumbent V thus controls an essential resource for provision of mobile
telecom services (the ‘upstream good’, i.e., radio spectrum), and may utilise this resource by
offering such services to consumers (the ‘downstream’ market). The costs of supplying a
quantity x of mobile telephony services to the market, when owning an amount of spectrum q,
are c(x,q). The monopolist, who has one unit of spectrum, q = 1, can therefore produce a
quantity x of the downstream good at costs c(x,1). We assume that ∂ci(xi,qi)/∂xi > 0 and
∂c(xi,qi)/∂qi ≤ 0. Marginal costs of producing a quantity x are positive, and costs of providing
mobile telephony services fall with the frequency range used. For this last condition, one might
imagine, for instance, that to supply a quantity x of mobile telephony services to the market,
requires a more sophisticated and expensive technology, or a denser antenna network, as the
available frequency range shrinks.
Entry
A second party, which we will call the entrant E, would like to provide mobile telephony
services y to the market, but E does not own any spectrum itself. The entrant therefore depends
on access toV ’s spectrum. In principle, entry may occur in two ways. First, the entrant may
acquire access to an incumbent’s infrastructure. In this way, a mobile virtual network operator
(MVNO) is formed. This form of entry is known as service-based access. In this case, both V
and the entrant jointly use the same network, and V needs to construct network capacity
sufﬁcient to accommodate both its own demand x as well as the capacity contracted by the
entrant y. Alternatively, E may enter by buying or leasing spectrum q fromV and setting up an
independent network. This form of entry is known as infrastructure-based access. Having traded
spectrum q bothV and E will construct their networks and supply mobile telephony services to
the market. V, having kept only 1−q units of spectrum, will incur costs c(x,1−q) for
producing a quantity x, while E will incur costs cE(y,q) (which might be equal or similar to
c(x,q)) . In all cases we assume retail costs to be negligible.
15Retail market
We assume both incumbentV and entrant E (if it gains access) compete in quantities in a
downstream market with consumers who perceive the two services as horizontally differentiated
substitutes. In practice, one may imagine the entrant targeting a speciﬁc niche market, selling the
service through its proprietary retail channel ( E might be a supermarket chain), or offering
telephony services bundled with some other product (E may be a bank selling mobile payment
services bundled with telephone services). Denoting quantities offered in the ﬁnal market by
x,y, we writeV’s inverse demand in the retail market as p(x,y), and E’s demand as pE(x,y).
The game
We consider a game in which the incumbent, V, has all the bargaining power. It is modelled as a
three stage game, with the following stages. We will analyse this game for both access modes:
service-based and infrastructure-based.
1. First,V offers a contract t(.) to E, where the monetary transfer from the entrant to the incumbent,
is a (possibly non-linear) function of y, the amount of contracted network capacity (in case of
service-based access) or the amount of spectrum q (in case of infrastructure-based access) sold.
2. Next, E may accept or reject the contract. If he accepts V’s offer, he chooses a quantity y (or q)
and pays t(y) (or t(q)) toV.
3. Finally, the incumbent and the entrant sell downstream quantities x and y in the retail market. In
case of service-based entry, the incumbent’s production costs are c(x,1). In case of
infrastructure-based entry, the incumbent’s production costs are c(x,1−q) and the entrant’s
c(y,q).
We will solve this game by backward induction, and consider subsequently service-based and
infrastructure-based access.
Analysis of service-based access
In the case of service-based access, the incumbent will offer a contract t(y) to the entrant, who
upon acceptance will choose his quantity y and make the required payment. In the ﬁnal stage of
the game, the incumbent will choose his own quantity x and produce a network capacity x +y.
Both players will sell their chosen quantities into the market. Excluding transfers, ﬁnal stage
proﬁts for the incumbent are therefore given by
π(x,y) = p(x,y)x −c(x +y,1)
while the entrant’s proﬁts will equal
πE(x,y) = pE(x,y)y
16The monopolist’s problem, in the ﬁnal stage of the game, is to optimise his downstream proﬁts π




which we shall assume leads to a unique x(y). Now we turn to the ﬁrst stages of the game,
where the monopolist offers a contract t(y). It is immediate that in this situation the monopolist
can choose payment t(y) so as to appropriate the entrant’s entire proﬁts, and V therefore will
design the contract so as to make E choose a quantity y optimising their joint proﬁts. Since the
contract does not specify x this optimisation is subject to x = x(y), the best response to entrant’s




s.t. x ∈ argmax
x
[π(x,y)]
We note here that althoughV, through the contract it offers, controls E’s quantity y, as well as its
own x, he cannot in general achieve the proﬁts he would obtain were he integrated with E. The
reason is thatV faces a commitment problem (as pointed out in Hart and Tirole, 1990): he
cannot commit to E to produce an x different from its individual best response to y. Except in
cases where products are either completely independent or perfect substitutes, this constraint
rules out joint optimal production.
Analysis of infrastructure-based access
We next turn to infrastructure-based access. In this set-up,V, prior to its network investment
decision, sells (or leases) a quantity of ‘raw’ spectrum q(out of its original endowment of one
unit of spectrum) to the entrant E. Subsequently, bothV and E invest in their networks and
technologies to convert their shares of spectrum into marketable telecommunications capacity.
The difference with the service-based access model above is therefore that technology choice
(or, effectively, the ratio of capacity compared to available spectrum) is decentralised to the
entrant. Contracts now take the form t(q). As the original endowment of spectrum was
normalised to one,V will have left at its own disposal a quantity of spectrum equal to 1−q.
Analysis of the optimal contracts case proceeds in a similar way as for service-based access,
albeit that the entrant now also incurs costs of infrastructure investment and makes an individual
capacity choice. In the third stage of the game, when spectrum fraction q has been determined,
incumbent and entrant will decide on what quantities to produce. Again excluding transfers,
proﬁt functions, given spectrum sold q, now take the form
π(x,y;q) = p(x,y)x −c(x,1−q)
πE(x,y;q) = pE(x,y)y −c(y,q)
17Choices will constitute a Cournot equilibrium (x(q),y(q)) between the two players, conditional
on spectrum traded, q. In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the monopolist will solve for q such that the
resulting Cournot equilibrium will optimise joint proﬁts, and offer this quantity to the entrant




s.t. x ∈ argmax
x
[π(x,y;q)]
and y ∈ argmax
y
[πE(x,y;q)]
As in the case of service-based access, V can not attain the joint optimum quantities. Now, in
addition, splitting of production implies loss of economies of scale (production costs for the
same capacity are higher when two networks have to be set up) so that also productive efﬁciency
is lower.
Choice between access types
In stage 1,V will, ﬁnally, make a choice between infrastructure and access-based entry offers,
and will choose the one giving the maximum joint payoffs. In appendix B we study a symmetric,
linear demand example. In this case, the choice for service-based access always optimises
monopolist proﬁts: the cost disadvantages of infrastructure duplication render
infrastructure-based access unattractive. This conclusion is not general, however. As a
counterexample, envisage a situation where the incumbent’s technology is less efﬁcient than the
entrant’s. One may for example assume that the ﬁrms incur additional retail costs for every unit
sold to end consumers. If the entrant’s retail costs are lower than the incumbent’s, surplus
maximisation requires the entrant to produce more than the incumbent. For homogeneous goods,
in fact, incumbent sales should be zero. Under service-based access, the incumbent cannot
commit not to produce, and an inefﬁcient production mix results. Since by selling the license,
the incumbent increases his own production costs, infrastructure-based access allows the
incumbent to credibly commit to output reduction. For homogeneous goods, selling the entire
spectrum (q = 1) to the more efﬁcient entrant is optimal.
183 The duopoly contracting game
Armed with the basic insights of the monopoly incumbent model, we now address the situation
in which there is a duopoly in the upstream sector. We now have two wireless spectrum owners,
V1 andV2 , each owning one unit of spectrum, and offering their wireless telecommunications
services to end users. Where in the monopoly situation, the entrant E relies onV’s network (or
resources) and cannot avoid paying its entire proﬁts toV, in the duopoly case E has a choice and
might be expected to be able to play out the two incumbentsVi against each other. We shall see
that this is true, but with a qualiﬁer: the access quantity that the entrant may obtain can be low
(or zero) in equilibrium.
In the duopoly contracting game, we will concentrate on situations where the entrant E
contracts capacity with either incumbent V1 or incumbentV2, but not with both. This is a natural
assumption if there are large ﬁxed transaction costs of doing business with each additional
counterparty. If such costs are not present, also equilibria where both incumbents give access
may exist. Moreover, equilibria with only one access provider may in that case require
exclusivity clauses. We consider this, more complex situation in appendix C.1.
For analysing the contracting game, we use similar reasoning as Bernheim and Whinston
(1998), who analysed a market structure with two rival upstream manufacturers, who offer
non-linear contracts to a retailer to sell their goods in the retailer’s shop. Here we slightly adapt
their analysis to allow for vertical integration of the upstream ﬁrms: the incumbents are also
active on the downstream market themselves. This implies that, in contrast with the case of
purely upstream active manufacturers, also the ﬁrm that does not write a contract with the
entrant will make non-zero proﬁts (from its own downstream activities), providing it with a
valuable outside option.
We model the situation analogously to the incumbent monopoly case discussed above. The
entrant will now get an offer ti(yi) (or ti(qi) in case of infrastructure access) from both V1 and
V2, (possibly with exclusivity clauses attached) and may choose to accept either offer or reject
both. In the ﬁnal stage, denote Vi ’s capacity by xi, and E ’s capacity by y. The three ﬁrmsVi
and E face an end-user market with inverse demands p1(x1,x2,y), p2(x1,x2,y), pE(x1,x2,y).
We ﬁrst observe that, like in the monopoly situation, the incumbents will offer contracts to
the entrant in which quantities yi (or qi) will be such that joint proﬁts of the entrant and
incumbent are optimised. (If this were not the case, the incumbent could always proﬁtably
deviate to the joint optimal quantity, and use the transfer ti to appropriate this extra surplus while
leaving the entrant indifferent). We deﬁne the resulting proﬁts (excluding the transfer ti) in an
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19The question now is, given proﬁts π
(i)
j,E, what price tj both incumbents will offer to the entrant,
and who will provide the winning bid. The result, the proof of which is detailed in appendix A, is




E of the entrant and incumbentVi is larger under
access than Vi’s proﬁts without access, the entrant will be granted access. If access takes place,

















The intuition for this result is that, as long as there is a gain to providing access, the incumbents
will compete to become the exclusive access provider, leaving some of the rents to the entrant.
The winning offer (byVi) should leave the rivalVj indifferent between winning and losing the
contracting game. The share of bilateral rents P(j) thatVj would be willing to leave to the
entrant is determined byVj ’s outside option, i.e. earning π
(i)
j if he does not supply. The proof is
an adaptation from the one presented in Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
204 Modes of access
The previous section derived the sharing of proﬁts between entrant and incumbent, given
equilibrium proﬁts. Now we analyse the choice of optimal y, q for the service-based and
infrastructure-based offers, extending the monopoly analysis carried out above.
A crucial difference with the monopoly situation is that in the ﬁnal stage, bothV1 andV2
compete in quantities, given y or q. Where in the monopoly case,V could obviously condition
his choice of capacity x on this contracted quantity, the matter is less straightforward in duopoly.
While the access providerVi can certainly take into account yi when deciding on his own
capacity xi the matter is less obvious for the rival Vj: is the information on yi (or qi) available to
the non-access-provider at the moment it makes its capacity choice xj? Clearly the answer to
this question inﬂuences capacity choices, with the non-access providing rival (sayV2)
anticipating a joint best response by V1 and E, in case of non-observability.
We assume that observability of contracts (or, in a more general model setting, the disability
to renegotiate a contract) differs between the two access modes. We would argue that a bilateral
contract for access to an incumbent’s network (service-based access) is less likely to be
observable to the rival incumbent (or more likely to be open for (secret) renegotiation during the
investment stage), than a sale of spectrum, and subsequent building activity by the entrant itself
(infrastructure-based access). Apart from observable separate building activity, also regulatory
arrangements are likely to make spectrum sale more transparent than capacity sales: much like
land registry, spectrum allocations (and changes in it) will be publicly registered.
Public observability of contracts leads to a precommitment effect (as studied in Fershtman
et al., 1991). The effective delegation of quantity setting decisions that occurs under
infrastructure-based competition will inﬂuence subsequent competition and therefore market
outcomes. We will see that the implications of such strategic delegation in this case may provide
a rationale for the access provider to choose for (perhaps productively inefﬁcient)
infrastructure-based access, rather than service-based access.
4.1 Service-based access
Under service based competition, we assume that contract quantity yi is not known toVj (i 6= j)
prior to its capacity investment choice (or can be secretly renegotiated beforeVj’s investment
decision). In a Nash equilibrium, non-access winning playerVj will therefore necessarily
assume that theVi −E couple contracts on an xi,yi pair that is an optimal response (in terms of
the bilateral proﬁts ofVi and E) to its own capacity choice xj, and vice versa. Joint proﬁt
maximisation again occurs since Vi may use the transfer ti to redistribute wealth. As in the
monopoly benchmark, however, access provider Vi is not free to adjust his own and the entrant’s
capacities at will: he is constrained by his inability to commit to produce any xi but the best
21response to contracted yi andVj’s anticipated xj. If in equilibriumVi makes the winning bid for
access to E, the resulting capacity choices will be such that E ’s capacity yi optimises joint
proﬁts, but subject to the Nash equilibrium conditions that both xi and xj are best responses to
both each other and yi.
Assuming for concreteness that V1 is the access-provider, we may deﬁne the proﬁts (leaving




The equilibrium conditions are then given by the following set of equations: V1 chooses its own
sales x
(1)
1 , as well as sales to the entrant y
(1)














subject to the constraint that V1 acts opportunistically: it chooses x
(1)
1 optimally given that it sold
y
(1)


































We next turn to infrastructure-based access, again restricting attention to exclusive contracts. In
this set-up, as before in the monopoly benchmark, either incumbentV1 or V2 may sell part of
their unit endowments of spectrum to the entrant, after which all three players make their
individual investment decisions. As above, we use the variable qi to denote spectrum sold byVi
to the entrant E. Contracts take the form (ti(qi),qi). As original endowments of spectrum to the
incumbents were normalised to one, q1,2 are the fractions of spectrum that V1,2 sell to E. This
means that incumbents will have left at their own disposal a quantity of spectrum equal to
1−q1,2.
As argued, in contrast with the service-based access case where one incumbent controls both
its own and the entrant’s investment, in this case it is more natural that E and access providerVi
cannot secretly renegotiate their spectrum sale q once the resource has been divested. Rival Vj
may credibly observe qi and base its own capacity choice on this information.
22With the information structure as just outlined, in contrast with service-based access, the ﬁnal
capacity stage of the game can be analysed contingent on spectrum sale qi which now is
common knowledge. The analysis resembles the monopoly analysis. The difference is that now
three players (instead of two) are involved in the Cournot game, with spectrum input qi (the
entrant), 1−qi (the access provider) and 1 (the rival incumbent). In the third stage of the game,
when spectrum fraction qi has been determined (and is publicly observed), both incumbents and
the entrant will decide on what quantities to produce. TakingV1 to be the exclusive access
provider we now have ﬁnal stage proﬁts (denoting the entrant’s capacity by xE to distinguish
from the service-based access game)
π1(x1,x2,xE;q1) = p1(x1,x2,xE)x1−c(x1,1−q1)
π2(x1,x2,xE;q1) = p2(x1,x2,xE)x2−c(x2,1)
πE(x1,x2,xE;q1) = pE(x1,x2,xE)xE −c(xE,q1)













and similarly for x
(1)
2 (q1) and x
(1)
E (q1).
In the spectrum sale stage of the game, the equilibrium of the ﬁnal subgame is anticipated





















4.3 Choice between access types
Having analysed the two options separately, we now explore the choice between offering
(exclusive) service-based access and infrastructure-based access. Delegation of investment to the
entrant, under infrastructure-based access, leads to loss of economies of scale. In the monopoly
situation, we observed that in the symmetric situation, this loss of production economies led to a
preference for service-based access. In the current duopoly setting, however, there is a
countervailing effect: infrastructure-based access allows the supplier to commit to a quantity (of
spectrum) assigned to the entrant. The delegation of the quantity choice for part of the spectrum
to a third party results, in this Cournot framework, in a commitment to jointly produce larger
capacity in the end-user market. While in a monopoly setting this is undesirable, with the
Cournot rival this move succeeds in persuading the rival to reduce his end-market quantity.
Although industry proﬁts may end up lower as a result of entry, the share of industry proﬁts
going to the access-provider and the entrant increases (at the expense of the
23non-access-provider).1
The two mechanisms thus lead to ambiguous incentives in the choice of access mode. In the
following example we will observe how, depending on cost levels, either mode of access may be
preferred.
4.4 Example
To clarify these results on exclusive contracts, we discuss a concrete example with linear
demand and compare competition under service-based access to competition under
infrastructure-based access.
Service-based access
We consider Cournot competition in differentiated goods, with linear and symmetric marginal




where xi is the quantity the vertically integrated incumbentVi supplies to the market, and y is the
quantity contracted by the entrant with incumbent Vi. Assume without loss of generality that V1
is the exclusive supplier.
If V1 offers the entrant a quantity y, the entrant knows that after it has accepted the contact,
V1 will choose to produce according to its best response R1(x2,y1) = (1−c−γ(x2+y))/2. This
implies that under service based competition ﬁrm V1 will choose to supply equilibrium quantity


























For homogeneous products (γ = 1) this immediately leads to y = 0, as in the monopoly case.
The incumbent rivals then trivially produce the Cournot duopoly quantities x1 = x2 = 1−c
3 . This
1 This commitment effect is similar to the one observed by Reynolds et al. (1983) in merger analysis in Cournot markets:
since for a homogeneous product, twice the triopoly proﬁts exceed the duopoly proﬁts, merger from triopoly to duopoly is
not proﬁtable.
24implies that in this situation where contracts are unobservable to the rival incumbent, the entrant
will not get access to the market. With homogeneous products, both rivals will foreclose entry in
equilibrium. Note that if downstream products are differentiated, the entrant will be allowed on
the market, with quantities increasing as products become more differentiated. In the limit that
products are independent (γ = 0) we get x∗
1 = x∗
2 = y∗ =
(1−c)
2 , i.e. each ﬁrm produces the
monopoly quantity in its respective market.
To see who gets what share of the proﬁts in equilibrium, we calculate the ﬁrms’ proﬁts after
transfers using claim 1. We have that in symmetry both incumbents get the excluded



























thin line), the incumbent’s proﬁts after transfer (thick line) and the entrant’s proﬁts after transfer
(dashed line). The graph clearly illustrates the effect of competition between the two incumbents
to be the entrant’s exclusive supplier. Although their proﬁts could increase by not supplying the
entrant, in equilibrium the entrant does gain entry (for γ < 1) and makes nonzero proﬁt. In the
absence of an offer by their rival, both incumbents would prefer to supply the entrant and reap
the additional rents. However, competition to be the exclusive supplier washes away these rents,
and leaves both incumbents worse off.


















To analyse infrastructure-based access, we have to assume a dependence of costs on alternative
endowments of spectrum resources. A practical description of such a cost structure is that the
costs of production only depend on the conversion rate of spectrum q into usable capacity x, or
c(x,q) = c(x/q). There are economies of scale: the costs of supplying the market with a
quantity x1+x2 with spectrum capacity q1+q2 by one ﬁrm, i.e., c(x1+x2,q1+q2), is lower
than costs of providing the same quantity by two networks separately, c(x1,q1)+c(x2,q2). In
practice economies of scale may arise as a result of costs that are only technology dependent
(e.g. costs of setting up a network, or of choosing more expensive technology to boost output
capacity), rather than output dependent. We continue the example with linear costs,
c(x,q) = cx/q. Furthermore, we keep the assumption of linear demand with heterogeneous
goods: pi = 1−xi −γxj −γxk where i 6= j 6= k 6= i.
Consider the subgame whereV1 has exclusively sold spectrum q < 1 to the entrant, and
therefore keeps 1−q for its own use, whereasV2 owns one unit of spectrum. Marginal
production costs of capacity for V1 are therefore c/(1−q), whileV2 has marginal costs of
capacity c and E faces marginal costs c/q. Players then choose what quantity to produce.
Effectively, this boils down to Cournot competition with asymmetric costs. The result in terms
of proﬁt functions is that
πi(ci,cj,ck) =




where i = 1,2,E, and c1 = c/(1−q), c2 = c and cE = c/q. Clearly, given the symmetric set-up,
analogous results follow for the reverse case where V2 is the exclusive supplier of spectrum to
the entrant. In the contracting stage, the ﬁrm providing entry chooses q to optimise bilateral




E (q). If an interior solution exists, it is necessarily q = 1/2 due
to the symmetry of bilateral proﬁts with respect to costs c1 and cE. For q = 1/2 to be a global
maximum, proﬁts for q = 1/2 should exceed the proﬁt of an individual ﬁrm under (symmetric)













. If this condition is not met, the
entrant will not gain entry to the market (q = 0) under the infrastructure-based access mode.
Choice between access modes
For each access mode, service and infrastructure-based, incumbents’ equilibrium offers will
involve that choice of y or q, respectively, which maximises their bilateral proﬁts with the
entrant. If incumbents are free to choose any access mode, they choose the mode of access that
maximises bilateral proﬁts. This implies that we simply have to compare bilateral proﬁts
calculated above to ﬁnd out which entry mode incumbents will choose in equilibrium. In our

















Figure 4.2 below demonstrates where either access mode dominates from a proﬁt, respectively a
welfare point of view. On the thick line in the c, γ plane the two proﬁts are equal, with
infrastructure proﬁts exceeding service-based proﬁts below the line, in region III, and
service-based proﬁts higher in regions I and II. Infrastructure-based competition dominates
service-based competition only for small costs c and low level of differentiation (high γ).
Figure 4.2 Boundary between equilibrium modes of access in the costs/differentiation plane; in region I service-
based access dominates, in region III infrastructure-based access does. In region II the market














27This result is consistent with intuition: the beneﬁt of infrastructure-based access over
service-based access is that ﬁrms can strategically commit to oversupply the market, by
delegating capacity choice to the entrant. This effect is larger when products are more
homogeneous (high γ). On the other hand, economies of scale favour service based access. Such
economies of scale are lower for low c. So far, we have restricted our analysis to exclusive
contracts. In appendix C.1, we show that this result remains valid if we allow for contracts with
common representation (where the entrant signs a contract with both incumbents).
We also calculated (see appendix D) what type of access a regulator would mandate, if it
would optimise combined ﬁrms’ and consumers’ surplus. On the dashed line, combined surplus
in case of service-based competition equals combined surplus in case of infrastructure-based
competition. Below this line, in regions II and III, infrastructure-based competition dominates,
above the line, in region I, service-based competition dominates.
285 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse entry into wireless telecommunications markets, where radio spectrum
is an essential but scarce input. When this essential input is in the hands of oligopolistic
incumbents, entrants have to either negotiate access to an incumbent’s infrastructure
(service-based access), or access to part of the spectrum itself, allowing them to build their own
infrastructure. Increased competition that results from entry into the market generically erodes
the incumbents’ proﬁts. We ﬁnd that as long as the entrant’s proﬁts outweigh the loss in proﬁts
of the incumbent that provides access, entry will take place. Moreover, both incumbents
compete away the gains in joint proﬁts, and in equilibrium may be worse off than without entry.
At ﬁrst sight, the loss of economies of scale in infrastructure-based entry imply that i)
aggregate capacity investment under infrastructure based access will be lower than for
service-based access, and ii) both entrant and joint proﬁts will be reduced. This would suggest
that for incumbents offering service-based access would be a dominant strategy, and that the
implementation of spectrum trade would not affect ﬁrm behaviour.
However, commitment properties of both types of access are different. In particular, outside
observability of contracted quantities between an incumbent and an entrant is arguably lower
under service-based entry than under infrastructure-based entry. Under the former, contracted
capacities are speciﬁed only in a bilateral private contract, while spectrum rights will typically
be administered by a public spectrum authority. Also the fact that multiple parties’ investments
will be observed contributes to outside monitoring of capacity decisions. If indeed such
commitment effects are stronger under access to spectrum, rather than access to network
capacity, then there will be a trade-off between both types of access. If both product
heterogeneity between incumbent and entrant and economies of scale in network investment are
large, service-based access will remain the optimal strategy for spectrum incumbents.
Conversely, if scale effects are small and products are relatively homogeneous, so that beneﬁts of
multiple retail channels are low, incumbents may prefer infrastructure based access. Because the
delegation of the capacity decision to the entrant allows an incumbent and entrant jointly to
commit to a larger capacity, the rival incumbent will reduce its capacity choice. In this way, the
incumbent and the entrant increase joint proﬁts at the expense of the rival.
In our example, we assumed exogenous differentiation of the entrant’s retail service. If the
network that provides access inﬂuences the differentiation of the entrant’s product, a so-called
cannibalisation effect may occur (Ordover and Shaffer, 2007). The entrant would may then
disproportionately cannibalise on the market share of the incumbent that provides entry,
compared to the competing incumbent that does not provide entry. While such a circumstance
does not alter our general conclusion that, in our Cournot setting, entry is allowed as long as it
increases bilateral proﬁts, this could affect the choice between the modes of access. In particular,
if the entrant’s product is more strongly differentiated from the incumbent under
29infrastructure-based entry, this mode of access could dominate over a larger range of parameters.
A desirable extension of our model would be to allow for multiple entrants. If the entrants
operate in distinct markets and do not effectively compete, this extension is straightforward.
Allowing for competition between entrants signiﬁcantly complicates the analysis. In that case
externalities are introduced between various downstream entrants as well, and optimal contracts
may also involve exclusivity clauses restricting an incumbent to sell to multiple entrants (
so-called ‘input foreclosure’). Equilibrium in contracting games with externalities where both
sides of the market (i.e. incumbents and entrants, in our case) consist of multiple players is still
poorly understood (see e.g. Whinston, 2006, chapter 4 for a discussion of the issue, and Spector,
2007 for recent progress in this direction).
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32Appendix A Proof of claim 1
Proof. First of all, it is clear that access will be provided if and only if this increases bilateral
proﬁts of the incumbent and the entrant. If no access were given (by either incumbent) an
incumbent could always proﬁt by providing access and using the transfer ti to appropriate the
additional joint proﬁts, leaving the entrant indifferent. A similar argument shows that the traded
quantity of capacity y or spectrum q is such that it maximises joint bilateral proﬁts. So let us
look at the equilibrium payments for these quantities, t1 and t2, that incumbentsV1,2 ask from the
entrant. Assume that it isV1 ’s contract that is accepted by the entrant. We have that
π
(1)
E −t1 = π
(2)
E −t2 (A.1)
The left-hand side cannot be smaller than the right-hand side, or the entrant would accept V2’s
offer. And the left-hand side cannot be larger than the right-hand side, orV1 could proﬁtable






orV2 would reduce its required payment, t2, slightly to be accepted by the entrant. And thirdly,
π
(1)
1 +t1 ≥ π
(2)
1
orV1 would prefer to have its offer rejected by the entrant. We combine these three conditions,
and furthermore focus on the equilibrium where A.2 holds with equality (as this makes both
















leading to the pay-offs as described, while the ﬁnal condition implies that for this equilibrium to














which proves the remaining point.
3334Appendix B Monopoly with linear demand
We analyse the game with a monopolist incumbent for a particular example, with linear demand
pI = 1−x −γy and pE = 1−y −γx. We further assume costs c(x,q) = c x
q, linear in x, and
exhibiting economies of scale in q. We ﬁrst analyse the service-based access game, and then turn
to infrastructure-based competition. The monopolist will in the end choose the access type
which maximises his proﬁts.
In the case of service based competition the monopolist produces at costs cx (i.e. we have
q = 1). Given the capacity contracted to the entrant, y, the monopolists’ best response own
capacity is r(y) = (1−yγ −c)/2. The incumbent therefore chooses y to optimise
πI(r(y),y)+πE((r(y,y)) = (1−r(y)−γy)r(y)−c(r(y)+y)+(1−y −γr(y))y. The solution








. The monopoly can










In the case of infrastructure based competition, the monopolist chooses q to optimise
πI(x(q),y(q),q)+πE(x(q),y(q),1−q), where x(q),y(q) are the equilibrium quantities
produced if the monopolist has sold q units of spectrum to the entrant, i.e., the Nash equilibrium
in quantities when the incumbent’s proﬁts are πI(x,y) = (1−x −γy)x −cx/(1−q) and the
entrants proﬁts are πE(x,y) = (1−y −γx)y −cy/q. The solution is q = 1/2, where












E for γ ∈ (0,1).




3536Appendix C Common representation
In the main text we considered effectively exclusive equilibria, where eitherV1 or V2 dealt with
the entrant, but not both. This might be a realistic situation if relation speciﬁc costs are high, and
bilateral contracts between entrant and both incumbents would be prohibitively costly. If such
costs are not particularly high, contracts with only one provider may still result under explicit
exclusivity clauses. As argued in Bernheim and Whinston (1998), common representation
equilibria (where both incumbents supply the entrant) dominate exclusive equilibria whenever
total industry proﬁts under common representation exceed industry proﬁts under exclusive
contracts. In particular, this is the case whenever there are no contracting externalities among the
two incumbents, that is, when V1’s proﬁts (excluding transfers) do not depend on y2 (or q2), and
vice versa. This would for example be the case if the two vertically integrated ﬁrms operate in
distinct markets. In general, however, in our set-up the fact that both incumbents compete with
the entrant in the downstream market leads to contracting externalities, and there may exist
situations where exclusive contracts dominate common representation.
Here, we consider the possibility of common representation equilibria. We describe the
relevant contracts and the conditions determining equilibrium capacities or spectrum quantities,
and work these out for the example under consideration.
C.1 Common representation contracts




E for equilibrium proﬁts excluding transfers for the three players in this conﬁguration. Denote
total proﬁts by Pc ≡ πc
1 +πc
2 +πc
E. We again denote joint proﬁts of incumbent and entrant under
the exclusive contract by P(i), if incumbentVi provides access. A straightforward adaptation of
the results in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) similar to the one in appendix A for this case leads
to the following
Claim 2. Common access, where both incumbents contract with the entrant, is an equilibrium
only if total sector proﬁts Pc exceed those under exclusive equilibrium. In that case, the common
access equilibrium is preferred to exclusive representation by both incumbents. Equilibrium
pay-offs (after transfers) are
E : P(1)+P(2)−Pc
1 : Pc −P(2)
2 : Pc −P(1)
The derivation of this claim relies on the observation that the rents left to the entrant should be
sufﬁciently high to ensure that neither incumbent can deviate to an exclusive contract and leave
37both entrant and itself better off.
C.2 Access under common representation
The analysis of equilibrium under both modes of access under common contracts is slightly
complicated: both ﬁrms may offer service-based access (capacities y1,2) or infrastructure-based
access (spectrum q1,2), or one ﬁrm (sayV1) may offer service-based and the other (V2)
infrastructure-based access3. In this latter hybrid structure, the entrant’s total capacity consists of
the leased capacity y1 plus any quantity xE it produces using its spectrum rights q2.
We proceed by writing the optimisation problems for both ﬁrms. We distinguish the three
cases (service-service, infra-infra and hybrid), and for each case determine the conditions for
optimum capacity or spectrum choices. Each incumbent will choose its offer such that bilateral
proﬁts with the entrant are maximised, given its rival’s (accepted) offer.
If both ﬁrms offer service-based access, again neither incumbentVi observes his rival’s bid
yj. Either incumbent’s choice of xc
i ,yc
i optimises bilateral proﬁts with the entrant, given the
competitor’s choice xc
j,yc
j. Again, the incumbents cannot just choose any combination xc
i ,yc
i that
is a best response to its rival’s choices. The incumbent will behave opportunistically when
competing in the retail market, and the entrant will only accept a contract that takes into account
this opportunistic behaviour. Therefore xc




for the incumbent when competing in the retail market. The common equilibrium in which both




j satisfying the joint






















If both ﬁrms offer infrastructure-based access, all players can observe contracted quantities of
spectrum, q1,2. Spectrum offers q1,2 are chosen to maximise incumbent-entrant bilateral proﬁts,
subject to the ﬁnal stage equilibrium xc




























where the common equilibrium quantities xc
1,2,E(q1,q2) as functions of q1 and q2 are the Cournot







3 We ignore the possibility that a single ﬁrm might offer both capacity and spectrum.





πE(x1,x2,xE;q1,q2) = pE(x1,x2,xE)xE −c(xE,q1+q2)
Finally, we consider a hybrid equilibrium. We assume w.l.o.g. thatV1 makes a service-based
offer y, andV2 makes an infrastructure-based offer q. Again we assume q is observable while y
is not. In practice this is equivalent to saying that y will be chosen after q. This implies that
yc
1,qc














































whereV1 and the entrant observe y1, butV2 doesn’t.
Example
We again consider our example with linear demand, symmetric ﬁrms, differentiated goods and
constant marginal costs of production. If both incumbents offer service-based access, we ﬁnd
that the market outcome under common contracts is the same as under exclusive contracts: any
y1+y2 = y∗
1 is an equilibrium (where y∗
1 was given in equation 4.2), and proﬁts after transfers
are the same in each of these equilibria. The reason is that, in our speciﬁc example, only the total
quantity y1+y2 produced by the entrant matters for each incumbent’s choice of quantity x1. For
linear and symmetric costs, each incumbent will want to set the entrant’s total quantity y1+y2
equal to the value y∗
1 obtained in case of exclusive contracts.
Next, we consider a common equilibrium where both incumbents offer infrastructure-based
access, i.e., where ﬁrm 1 sells capacity q1 and ﬁrm 2 sells capacity q2. Again competition in the
ﬁnal stage of the game boils down to Cournot competition with asymmetric costs, with
c1 = cx1/(1−q1), c2 = cx2/(1−q2) and c3 = cx3/(q1+q2). We ﬁnd that in the contracting
stage there are three candidates for symmetric equilibria: q1 = q2 = 1/3, q1 = q2 = 1 and
q1 = q2 = 0. We focus on the ﬁrst one, the latter leading to degenerate situations of monopoly
and duopoly. The (1/3,1/3) conﬁguration is an equilibrium only if deviation by either
incumbent to qi = 0 or qi = 1 does not lead to higher bilateral proﬁts. This is the case for c and γ
39sufﬁciently small. However, it should also be unproﬁtable for one of the incumbents to deviate
by offering service based access. It turns out that this equilibrium is not stable against such a
deviation.
Finally, we consider the hybrid common equilibrium, where incumbentV1 offers service
based access and sells a quantity y to the entrant andV2 offers infrastructure based access and
sells capacity q to the entrant. Because y is unobservable toV2, y is effectively chosen after q is
observed. We ﬁnd that in such an equilibrium, y will always be chosen such that xE equals zero,
and in turn this implies that optimal q equals 0. Therefore, the hybrid common equilibrium
reduces to the exclusive equilibrium under service based access.
We conclude that, in this speciﬁc example, ﬁrms will always choose service based access (in
which case they are indifferent between exclusive and common contracts, each leading to
identical pay-offs), unless exclusive infrastructure based contracts dominate. Thus, considering
common contracts in this explicit example does not affect the results obtained in the absence of
such contracts.
40Appendix D Choice of access type by a regulator
We assume that the regulator optimises the sum of consumer and ﬁrm surplus
W =U(x1,x2,y)− p1x1− p2x2− pEy +π1+π2+πE
Using the results for the xiand y in case of service-based competition and exclusive and common
contracts, and for infrastructure-based competition in case of exclusive and common contracts,
we ﬁnd that











2(14c2γ 3−39c2γ 2−20c2γ +108c2−20cγ 3+50cγ 2
+ 40cγ −120c+6γ 3−15γ 2−12γ +36)
WIC =
3
32(γ +1)
2 (3c−2)
2(2γ +3)
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